President Donald Trump is scheduled to meet Chinese leader Xi Jinping in May 2026, where he is expected to raise China’s inclusion in arms control discussions. The United States will also address multilateral control at the NPT Conference in New York. Although the United States has long invited China to join nuclear arms control negotiations, China has declined, viewing its nuclear forces as insufficient for disarmament and interpreting arms control as a U.S. effort to secure nuclear superiority. The United States expects Russia to support this initiative, but the lack of concrete proposals limits prospects for cooperation, increasing the likelihood of an escalating arms race.
Rationale for Trilateral Arms Control
The United States considers the current situation imbalanced: it has complied with arms control agreements, while Russia has violated them and China has expanded its arsenal without joining any agreements. Xi Jinping’s 2021 call to accelerate strategic deterrence modernization reinforced U.S. concerns about the growing role of nuclear weapons in China’s military planning. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates China possesses approximately 600 nuclear warheads, potentially reaching 1,500 by 2035. Admiral Charles Richard, the then commander of the U.S. Strategic Command suggested the arsenal could increase even further, potentially enabling parity or superiority over the United States. Consequently, U.S. strategy now recognizes China as a major nuclear power.
China has not confirmed these estimates, but its refusal to discuss its nuclear program reinforces U.S. concerns about its intentions. China is also enhancing qualitative capabilities, including early warning and command systems, precision-guided nuclear-capable missiles, and space and cyber assets. U.S. experts argue these developments could alter China’s nuclear doctrine, including its commitment to non-first-use.
Authoritarian Cooperation and Regional Risks
U.S. officials view the deepening Russia–China partnership as a new strategic threat, potentially enabling coordinated or parallel aggression in multiple theaters. Thomas DiNanno, the head of the U.S. delegation to the NPT Review Conference in Geneva, said that Russia is supporting China in its efforts to build up its nuclear arsenal. The situation is further complicated by North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities and possible access to Russian military technologies.
Implications for U.S. Deterrence
U.S. experts agree that China’s nuclear development creates a dual-deterrence challenge involving both Russia and China, increasing the risk of nuclear escalation. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory responsible for shaping U.S. policy on strategic offensive arms, believe that the conventional armed forces of the U.S. alone will likely not be enough to win in two simultaneous theaters of war. This means that the risks of nuclear conflict are increasing. Admiral Charles Richard, the former commander of Strategic Command, admitted that he is not sure how to maintain strategic stability in a three-party world.
The Taiwan Factor
In the Indo-Pacific, risks are intensified by tensions around Taiwan. The United States expects continued Chinese pressure toward unification, potentially supported by increased confidence in nuclear capabilities. A conflict scenario could involve implicit or explicit nuclear threats, particularly if China risks defeat. China may also use nuclear coercion to deter U.S. allies and prevent intervention.
Concerns extend to potential proliferation, as U.S. allies might reconsider commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty if threatened.
China is developing lower-yield nuclear warheads and deploying numerous dual-purpose missiles in the region, enabling the effective use of tactical nuclear weapons against targets. Meanwhile, influential conservatives and lawmakers have warned the Donald Trump administration that the United States lacks tactical nuclear weapons capable of countering China in a potential Indo-Pacific conflict, potentially undermining U.S. deterrence in the region.
U.S. military assessments emphasize strengthening conventional deterrence through increased regional deployments and arms transfers to Taiwan. However, China may underestimate escalation risks and U.S. nuclear response scenarios.
Arms Control Approaches
Trump Administration view a trilateral arms control agreement covering all nuclear forces of the United States, Russia, and China as optimal. Alternatives include parallel bilateral negotiations. China’s potential to reach U.S. levels of deployed warheads undermines arguments for exclusively U.S.–Russia agreements.
U.S. stress the need for verifiable commitments, expressing skepticism toward China’s non-first-use policy and its declared peaceful intentions. Efforts to engage China have been hindered by unclear U.S. negotiation positions and perceived inconsistency. As a result, near-term inclusion of China is unlikely.
Deterrence Measures
However, the United States plans to use two approaches in its long-term strategy: applying pressure by linking U.S. nuclear expansion to China’s buildup and offering incentives demonstrating mutual benefits of strategic stability.
The first strategy proposes measures including the expansion of submarines, ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers, alongside developing new delivery systems and enhancing intelligence capabilities. The United States may also increase deployed warheads by utilizing reserve capacity, potentially reaching approximately 4,625 operationally deployed nuclear weapons by 2050. These measures aim to sustain deterrence, reassure allies, and address strategic uncertainty.
China’s refusal to negotiate has already influenced U.S. policy, including the return of sea-based nuclear cruise missiles and increased focus on hypersonic systems. Planned deployments of intermediate-range missiles in the Indo-Pacific further reinforce deterrence.
Realizing that significant agreements are not feasible, the second approach suggests agreeing on notification of missile launches and discussing issues related to incident management at sea and space, as well as agreeing on the responsible use of new technologies associated with strategic stability.
Russia’s Position
China is a key international partner of Russia, sharing similar positions on major global issues. Following international sanctions, China has become Russia’s primary economic partner. The increased level of military cooperation between Russia and China has led the United States to see it as a potentially new threat of joint aggression on the two theaters of military operations in the future.
However, their cooperation is mainly focused on technological exchange and political communication, rather than a formal military alliance. As noted by Gustavo Zlauvinen, there is no clear evidence of comprehensive strategic coordination between the two states.
Privately, Russian military officials acknowledge that China poses a growing threat. Due to the shared border, many Chinese ballistic missiles have strategic relevance for Russia, alongside China’s superiority in conventional forces. While current cooperation provides short-term stability, China’s continued military development could increase risks for Russia.
Russian defense experts have long questioned U.S. estimates of China’s nuclear capabilities. Earlier assessments suggested up to 1,000 warheads, while current estimates range from 700 to 900, with a potential for growth to 1,500-3,600. China’s lack of transparency reinforces suspicions that its arsenal may exceed publicly available estimates.
Russian experts also question the credibility of China’s declared “minimum deterrence” doctrine. Rapid economic growth, increased defense spending, and military modernization suggest a shift toward a more robust nuclear posture. Reforms of China’s missile forces in 2016, including signs of higher readiness levels, indicate movement toward a strategic deterrence model comparable to other major powers.
Moscow rejects Beijing’s proposal to prohibit first use of nuclear weapons, viewing it as incompatible with Russia’s security needs given NATO and China’s conventional advantages. Russian military experts also assess that certain Chinese intercontinental and medium-range missiles could target key regions of Russia, including Siberia and the Far East.
Concerns over China’s intermediate-range missile capabilities have persisted in Russia for years. Despite unchanged threat perceptions, political considerations now limit open criticism, as Moscow seeks to avoid tensions with Beijing. At the same time, Russian leadership recognizes that U.S. strategic interests in Asia contributed to Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty.
China’s advances in missile technology may reduce Russia’s ability to neutralize China’s nuclear threats. Some Russian military experts argue that additional deployment of medium-range systems in Asia may be required, which may formally be justified as a response to the United States. Consequently, Russia maintains nuclear forces partly to deter China, although both sides avoid officially acknowledging mutual nuclear deterrence.
A significant expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal could destabilize the Asia-Pacific region, prompting the United States and its allies to increase missile deployments. This scenario also poses risks for Russia, as U.S. systems in countries such as Japan and South Korea could target its Far Eastern infrastructure. Additionally, regional proliferation risks may grow, including potential nuclear ambitions in Japan and South Korea and intensified competition between India and Pakistan. Therefore, many Russian officials and independent experts consider arms control as a means of reducing these risks.
Since 2012, Vladimir Putin has emphasized that future disarmament efforts should involve all nuclear powers. However, Russia later acknowledged China’s reluctance to participate due to its comparatively smaller arsenal. Moscow’s evolving position is also influenced by its own modernization programs, which have strengthened its strategic capabilities. Officially, Russia prioritizes the inclusion of France and the United Kingdom in negotiations, while recognizing that multilateral agreements remain unlikely in the near term.
Accordingly, Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister has stated that the United States should engage China independently if it seeks its participation in arms control. Similar views were expressed by Sergei Vershinin, Deputy Foreign Minister, who described accelerated nuclear disarmament as unrealistic. Russia’s position reflects both a desire to avoid tensions with China and a lack of interest in U.S.-proposed negotiation formats.
However, in the event of improved U.S.-Russia relations, Moscow may support China’s inclusion in arms control as part of a broader multilateral framework. Despite its partnership with Beijing, Russia does not dismiss the risks associated with China’s nuclear growth. Some experts argue that involving China in arms control could strengthen Russia’s negotiating position with the United States. Pro-Kremlin expert Sergei Karaganov and his colleagues highlight China’s strategic capabilities as a long-term concern and advocate for greater transparency in nuclear arsenals and military doctrines.
Russia and the United States share a common understanding of China’s nuclear threat. In the long term, Russia is interested in arms control with China. While Russia is dependent on China, it finds it difficult to criticize Chinese policies, but if relations with the U.S. normalize, Russia may change its rhetoric about China’s growing nuclear capabilities.
Neither China nor Russia seems to be ready to enter into a dialogue with the United States at this time. The United States, aware of this, is prepared to develop, modernize, and enhance its nuclear capabilities, in the hope that China and Russia would agree to halt this process through arms control talks. However, it would take 10-15 years for both China and the U.S. to develop new expanded nuclear capabilities. During this time, the world could face a new arms race, leading to increased potential for conflicts and escalation in different regions of the world.
Maxim Starchak is a fellow at the Centre for International and Defence Policy, Queen’s University.
